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OPINION OF THE COURT
_________
ALDISERT, Circuit Judge.
Plaintiff State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., as subrogee of Rocky and Suzanne
Mountain, appeals from the disqualification of its primary expert witness following a pre-
trial hearing held pursuant to the teachings of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509
U.S. 579 (1993), and a subsequent entry of summary judgment in favor of Defendants
Holmes Products and J.C. Penney Co., Inc.  Defendants are the distributor and seller,
respectively, of a free-standing torchiere-style halogen floor lamp that State Farm alleges
to be the cause of a fire that destroyed the Mountains’ home.  State Farm contends that a
window curtain on the west wall of the living room of the Mountain residence caught fire
by coming into contact with the halogen lamp’s bulb.  We must decide two things:
(1) whether the District Court properly excluded the testimony of State Farm’s expert on
the issue of causation; and (2) if so, whether the absence of this expert testimony
regarding causation warranted summary judgment in favor of Defendants.  We have
jurisdiction to review this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Because we answer both
questions in the affirmative, we will affirm the decision of the District Court.
3I.
The parties are familiar with the facts and the proceedings in the District Court, so
we will only briefly revisit them here.  On April 5, 1999, the home of Rocky and Suzanne
Mountain was destroyed in a fire.  At the time of the fire, the home was insured by State
Farm.  The Mountains thereafter filed a claim pursuant to that policy, for which they
received $197,654.92, and State Farm was subrogated to the rights of the Mountains. 
After investigating the claim, State Farm came to the conclusion that the fire was caused
by a torchiere-style halogen lamp sold by J.C. Penney and distributed by Holmes
Products.
This halogen lamp had been subject to a Consumer Product Safety Commission
(“CPSC”) recall in August 1997 because it lacked a wire or glass guard.  According to the
CPSC, the halogen lamp bulb could reach extremely high temperatures capable of
igniting curtains, clothing or other flammable materials.  As a result of the recall, J.C.
Penney issued a safety notice, to be sent to customers, that free safety guards were
available for halogen lamps sold prior to August 1997.  It also notified all its stores of the
recall.  The Mountains purchased their halogen lamp from J.C. Penney in February 1998. 
It is undisputed that the lamp did not have a wire or glass guard and that the Mountains
were never provided with the safety notice.
On April 5, 1999, the day of the fire, the Mountains had left their home at
approximately 6:45 a.m. with the halogen lamp still on.  Around 9:20 a.m., the Bradford
4Township Volunteer Fire Department was called to combat a fire at the Mountains’
residence.  After the fire company extinguished the fire, the fire chief inspected the scene
and determined that the fire originated in the area of the living room where the halogen
lamp was located.  He theorized that it was caused by either a short in the lamp’s
electrical cord or the draperies coming into contact with the lamp.
State Farm’s expert, Brian Gray, a fire investigator, subsequently conducted an
investigation of the fire.  He found the following: (1) the fire originated in the western
part of the living room based on fire pattern analysis; (2) this was the area where the lamp
was located; (3) there was no defined ring on the carpet where the lamp would have stood
throughout the fire, indicating that it had fallen over; (4) there were no signs of electrical
arcing on the halogen lamp and the insulation on the lamp’s external power cords
remained intact, indicating that the fire was not electrical in nature; (5) the damage to the
lamp’s wiring was restricted to that section inside the poles, with the heaviest amount of
damage sustained at the top of the lamp and around the halogen bulb, indicating that it
was subject to higher heat; (6) the halogen bulb could reach temperatures high enough to
ignite flammable material located within one or two inches of the lamp’s bulb; and (7) the
room’s heavy cotton draperies were located one and a half to two feet away from the
lamp.  The evidence also showed that the lamp was approximately six feet tall, that the
draperies hung from a height of approximately nine feet, and that on the morning of the
fire no windows or doors were open in the home.
5Based on the above information, Gray eliminated all other potential causes of the
fire and concluded that it was caused by the draperies coming into contact with the
defective lamp:
Well, we know that the lamp was close to the vicinity of the draperies.  We
know that the lamp was always on, and by doing a process of elimination in
this area of fire origin and, for example, eliminating all other igniting sources,
the only item relative to causation of the fire was the halogen lamp; the only
ignitable materials that were in that area were the draperies.
(App. at 78.)
As to how the lamp came in contact with the draperies, Gray then hypothesized
that the Mountains’ large boxer dog, who perished in the fire, might have accidentally
pulled the window draperies over the lamp or knocked or tilted the lamp into the
draperies in an effort to investigate the tree trimming that was occurring in the home’s
vicinity that day.  Gray did concede, however, that the lamp may have remained standing
until the firefighters arrived and began their fire suppression efforts.  In addition, another
of State Farm’s experts, Matthew Balmer, testified that, in his opinion, the lamp stayed
standing throughout the fire.
On July 29, 2004, a Daubert hearing was held to determine the admissibility of
Gray’s testimony.  After considering written submissions, the District Court, Magistrate
Judge Donio presiding, granted Defendants’ motion to exclude Gray’s expert testimony. 
The Court found it significant that neither Gray nor Balmer could definitively state that
the lamp was knocked over before the fire began and that there was no factual support for
6Gray’s hypothesis that the Mountains’ dog caused the fire.  It therefore concluded that
Gray’s testimony did not satisfy Daubert’s “fit” requirement because his conclusion on
causation was based on assumptions and was not supported by any methodology.  See
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591.  The Court then excluded Gray’s testimony on the issue of
causation.
On November 3, 2004, the District Court granted summary judgment in favor of
Defendants, concluding that State Farm had not presented any evidence on the issue of
causation sufficient to show that the halogen lamp was the proximate cause of the fire. 
The Court stated that “[a]bsent Gray’s causation testimony, Plaintiff does not have
sufficient evidence to create an issue of fact for trial.”  More specifically, the Court found
that State Farm failed to present sufficient facts indicating how the defective halogen
lamp, which could only ignite materials located within one or two inches of the lamp’s
bulb, could have ignited the living room draperies that were one and one half to two feet
from the lamp.  Because of the lack of evidence “bridging the gap” from the draperies to
the defective halogen lamp, the Court concluded that “a jury could only speculate as to
whether the fire was caused by the lamp.”  The Court found this speculation to be
impermissible and accordingly granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
II.
We review an order granting summary judgment de novo, and we evaluate the
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.  Antol v. Perry, 82 F.3d
Although this appeal arose from the District of New Jersey, we apply1
Pennsylvania law to this dispute because the action was initially filed in the Western
District of Pennsylvania, but was later transferred to New Jersey for the convenience of
the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404.  Because of this transfer, the transferee court
must apply the choice of law rules of the transferor court, here Pennsylvania.  See Van
Dusen, 376 U.S. at 639.  Under Pennsylvania law, because there is no conflict between
the laws of other states that may have an interest in the current action and because the
governmental interests of those states would not be impaired were they not applied, a
court shall apply the law of the forum state, here Pennsylvania, pursuant to Van Dusen’s
precepts.  See Austin, 909 F. Supp. at 274.
7
1291, 1294-1295 (3d Cir. 1996).  We review a district court’s ruling as to the
admissibility of evidence under an abuse of discretion standard where the question
presented involves the application of the Federal Rules of Evidence.  Affiliated Mfrs.,
Inc. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 56 F.3d 521, 525 (3d Cir. 1995).  Pennsylvania’s
substantive law on strict products liability applies to this appeal.  See Van Dusen v.
Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 639 (1964); Austin v. Dionne, 909 F. Supp. 271, 274 (E.D. Pa.
1995).1
III.
We conclude that the Court acted within its broad discretion in disallowing the
expert testimony of Gray on the topic of causation because his testimony did not satisfy
the requirements of Daubert and Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.  First, Gray’s
testimony as to the actions of the Mountains’ dog was speculative insofar as this theory
was not supported by any scientific analysis or methodology that indicated that the dog in
fact brought the draperies into contact with the halogen lamp.  In interpreting Daubert,
8this Court has stated that “that the language of Rule 702 requiring the expert to testify to
scientific knowledge means that the expert’s opinion must be based on the ‘methods and
procedures of science’ rather than on ‘subjective belief or unsupported speculation.’”  In
re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 742 (3d Cir. 1994).  Accordingly, we agree
with the District Court that Gray’s testimony on the behavior of the Mountains’ dog was
not supported by any scientific analysis or methodology; it was merely unsupported
speculation and was therefore properly excluded.
Second, in the absence of any evidence that could lead a jury to reasonably
conclude that the draperies’ contact with the halogen lamp was the probable cause of the
fire, the Court did not exceed the permissible bounds of its discretion by precluding the
remainder of Gray’s testimony on causation.  Without a causal link between the fire, the
location of the halogen lamp, and the location of the heavy cotton draperies, the
remainder of Gray’s testimony would not have been helpful to the trier of fact for the
purposes of determining causation.  Unlike the two cases that State Farm cites addressing
similar exclusions of expert testimony, Breidor v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1134
(3d Cir. 1983), and Gichner v. Antonio Troiano Tile & Marble Co., 410 F.2d 238 (D.C.
Cir 1969), the Court here did not err in excluding Gray’s testimony because he was only
able to state how the fire started in terms of mere possibilities, and this causal supposition
was not sufficiently supported by evidence in the record.  See Breidor, 722 F.2d at 1138
(“Where a fire investigator identifies the cause of fire in terms of probabilities (as
9opposed to mere possibilities) by eliminating all but one reasonable potential cause, such
testimony is highly probative.”) (citing Gichner, 410 F.2d at 247).
Although Gray eliminated all but the draperies’ contact with the halogen lamp as
the possible source of the fire, his testimony lacks that logical indicia that would allow the
trier of fact to conclude that the remaining possibility was in fact the probable source of
the fire.   Breidor, 722 F.2d at 1138-1139 (“Where there is a logical basis for an expert’s
opinion testimony, the credibility and weight of that testimony is to be determined by the
jury, not the trial judge.”); Gichner, 410 F.2d at 247.  In the absence of testimony or
evidence explaining how the draperies came into contact with the halogen lamp, a trier of
fact could not be allowed to speculate that the Mountains’ dog knocked the lamp into the
curtains, especially when State Farm’s experts were unable to conclusively state whether
the lamp fell over before the fire began.  See Flagiello v. Crilly, 187 A.2d 289, 291 (Pa.
1963) (“We have said many times that the jury may not be permitted to reach its verdict
merely on the basis of speculation or conjecture, but that there must be evidence upon
which logically its conclusion may be based.”) (citation and quotations omitted). 
Although it is a close question, we conclude that the exclusion of the entirety of Gray’s
testimony was not an abuse of discretion because the Court could reasonably have
concluded that his remaining non-speculative testimony did not constitute scientific
Or, at most, the exclusion of this testimony was only harmless error in light of our2
conclusion that a trier of fact could only speculate as to how the draperies came into
contact with the halogen lamp.  See Becker v. ARCO Chem. Co., 207 F.3d 176, 180 (3d
Cir. 2000) (“In reviewing evidentiary rulings, if we find nonconstitutional error in a civil
suit, such error is harmless only ‘if it is highly probable that the error did not affect the
outcome of the case.’”).
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knowledge helpful for the purposes of determining causation.   See In re Paoli R.R. Yard2
PCB Litig., 35 F.3d at 742 (“Rule 702’s ‘helpfulness’ standard requires a valid scientific
connection to the pertinent inquiry as a precondition to admissibility.”) (citation and
quotations omitted).
Having concluded that the District Court did not err in excluding Gray’s testimony,
we also conclude that it properly granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. 
Under Pennsylvania law, causation is an essential element of a strict products liability
claim, Wilson v. Vermont Castings, Inc., 170 F.3d 391, 396 (3d Cir. 1999), and State
Farm, as plaintiff, has the burden of proving this essential element, Blancha v. Raymark
Indus., 972 F.2d 507, 511 (3d Cir. 1992).  Without evidence sufficient to create a material
issue of fact regarding causation, a jury could only speculate as to whether the halogen
lamp was indeed the cause of the fire.  See Fedorczyk v. Caribbean Cruise Lines, Ltd., 82
F.3d 69, 76 (3d Cir. 1996) (affirming a district court’s order granting summary judgment
where the plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence on the element of causation). 
Accordingly, because State Farm has failed to present facts sufficient to establish the
existence of an element essential to its case on which it would bear the burden of proof at
11
trial, the District Court properly entered summary judgment in favor of Defendants.  See
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-323 (1986) (“Rule 56(c) mandates the entry
of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party
who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential
to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.”).
V.
We have considered all contentions presented by the parties and conclude that no
further discussion is necessary.  The judgment of the District Court will be affirmed.
